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Abstract: I argue that any account attempting to do away with resultant or circumstantial 
moral luck is inconsistent with a natural response to the problem of constitutive moral luck. It is 
plausible to think that we sometimes contribute to the formation of our characters in such a way 
as to mitigate our constitutive moral luck at later times. But, as I argue here, whether or not we 
succeed in bringing about changes to our characters is itself a matter of resultant and circumstantial 








 It is widely thought that an agent is blameworthy for an action or its consequences only to 
the extent that the action or consequence was under the agent’s control and, thus, not just a matter 
of luck.1 But, as Bernard Williams (1981) and Thomas Nagel (1979) demonstrate, many of our 
ordinary moral judgments and practices presuppose that there can be cases in which two agents 
may differ in blameworthiness despite the differences between them being just a matter of luck. 
Such cases are cases of moral luck, and they come in a variety of flavors. There can be differences 
in what results from the actions over which the agents do not possess control (resultant moral luck), 
differences in the circumstances in which two agents are embedded and over which they lack 
control (circumstantial moral luck), and even differences in how two agents are constituted over 
which they have no control (constitutive moral luck).2 It appears, then, that the intuitive thought 
 
1 See Nelkin (2013), who refers to this intuitive thought as the “Control Principle.” 
2 Nagel (1979) distinguishes these three types of moral luck as well as a fourth, causal moral luck, 
which is luck in one’s actions being caused by events over which one had no control. It may be 
that this fourth category is redundant, since all instances of this type would also be instances of 
either circumstantial or constitutive moral luck—see Latus (2001)—but, in any case, I am setting 
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about control, on the one hand, and our ordinary moral judgments and practices, on the other, are 
in tension with each other.3 
 Some aim to resolve the tension by attempting to do away with moral luck.4 One way to 
do this is by becoming a skeptic about blameworthiness, but I will set aside that position here.5 
Another way to resolve the tension is by maintaining that agents may be blameworthy but that 
their blameworthiness is never affected by luck, at least luck in results or in circumstances.6 As I 
will argue in sections 3 and 4, however, any account attempting to do away with resultant or 
circumstantial moral luck is inconsistent with a natural response to the problem of constitutive 
moral luck. It is plausible to think that we sometimes contribute to the formation of our characters 
in such a way as to mitigate our constitutive moral luck at later times. In section 3, I will provide 
 
aside causal moral luck here. For an excellent discussion of resultant moral luck in particular, see 
Sartorio (2012). 
3 I am assuming what Robert Hartman calls the “Standard View” of moral luck, which presupposes 
a conception of luck as a lack of control. Some disagree with this conception of luck, but see 
Hartman (2017, chapter 2) for a defense of the lack of control conception. 
4 Throughout the paper I contrast “doing away” with moral luck, on the one hand, with “accepting” 
moral luck, on the other. These expressions are simply labels for classes of positions one might 
take regarding moral luck, and I do not intend to commit to some set of principles relating the 
reality of moral luck to the theoretical role played by moral luck-talk. Thanks to an anonymous 
reviewer for raising this point.  
5 For defenses of skepticism about blameworthiness, see Strawson (1994) and Levy (2011). Unlike 
the two alternatives I’ll discuss in this paper, skepticism apparently implies that many of our 
ordinary moral judgments and practices are mistaken. This counts against the skeptic’s response 
to moral luck, in my view, so unless the alternatives suffer greater problems than this, we have 
reason to reject the skeptical position. For a further response to Strawson, see Hartman (2018), and 
for a further response to Levy, see Hartman (2017, chapter 3) and Cyr (2019a). 
6 It is worth mentioning a third type view, the “character solution” to resultant and circumstantial 
moral luck, defended by Richards (1986), Thomson (1989), and Rescher (1990), according to 
which there is no resultant or circumstantial moral luck “because people are originally 
praiseworthy and blameworthy in virtue of, and only in virtue of, their good and bad character 
traits” (Hartman 2020a: 105). See Hartman (2020a) for discussion and objections. In addition to 
Hartman’s worries, these views are plagued by far more constitutive moral luck than the account 
that I sketch later in the paper. In any case, proponents of the character solution would readily 
admit the reality of moral luck. 
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a sketch of this account, offering some examples to motivate its intuitive plausibility. But, as I go 
on to argue in section 4, whether or not we succeed in bringing about changes to our characters is 
itself a matter of resultant and circumstantial moral luck. My main aim in this paper is to show that 
if we accept this plausible account of the mitigation of constitutive moral luck, then we must accept 
circumstantial and resultant moral luck.7 
If I am right about this, we face a dilemma: either we deny that our constitutive moral luck 
may be mitigated by character-formation, or we must admit the reality of resultant and 
circumstantial moral luck. I will conclude, in section 5, by considering whether the dilemma can 
be evaded by employing the scope of blameworthiness/degree of blameworthiness distinction in 
responding to the problem of constitutive moral luck. Appealing to cases (familiar from the 
literature on free will and the historicity of moral responsibility) of radical character-formation 
brought about by manipulation and initial design, I argue that such a proposal fails to take seriously 
the ways in which constitutive moral luck can mitigate blameworthiness, and I conclude that moral 
luck is inescapable. 
 
2. The Scope/Degree Response to Resultant and Circumstantial Moral Luck 
 According to one proposal that attempts to do away with certain types of moral luck while 
at the same time resisting skepticism about blameworthiness, it is crucial to distinguish between 
the scope of an agent’s blameworthiness, on the one hand, and the degree of her blameworthiness, 
 
7 As far as I know, this point has not been made explicit in the literature on moral luck, though 
after writing this paper I saw a draft of Hartman (Forthcoming), which includes an abbreviated 
discussion of this point. 
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on the other.8 To see how this distinction is meant to help in doing away with moral luck, consider 
the following case by Michael Zimmerman: 
Suppose that George shot at Henry and killed him. Suppose that Georg shot at Henrik in 
circumstances which were, to the extent possible, exactly like those of George (by which I 
mean to include what went on "inside" the protagonists' heads as well as what happened in 
the "outside" world), except for the fact that Georg's bullet was intercepted by a passing 
bird (a rather large and solid bird) and Henrik escaped injury. Inasmuch as the bird's flight 
was not in Georg's control, the thesis that luck is irrelevant to moral responsibility implies 
that George and Georg are equally morally responsible. This, I believe, is absolutely 
correct. (2002: 560) 
In this case, George and Georg have exactly the same amount of control over their respective 
assassination attempts, and the difference in what results (Henry’s death, in George’s case, and a 
failed assassination attempt, in Georg’s case) lies outside of their control. Given this, the two 
should be considered equally blameworthy. Unless we are skeptics about blameworthiness, 
however, we will want to say that George is blameworthy for Henry’s death, yet Georg is not 
blameworthy for Heinrik’s death (since, in his case, the assassination attempt failed). 
 Zimmerman goes on to explain how the scope/degree distinction may be used to resolve 
this tension: 
I do not wish to deny that George is responsible for killing Henry…And, of course, I 
concede that Georg is not responsible for killing Henrik (or for Henrik's death), since 
Henrik did not die. Thus I am quite willing to grant that George may well be responsible 
 
8 See especially Zimmerman (2002). While I focus primarily on Zimmerman’s version of this 
view, my argument extends to any non-skeptical attempt to do away with moral luck, including, 
e.g., Enoch and Marmor (2007) and Swenson (2019).  
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for more things than Georg. What I deny is that George is any more responsible than Georg. 
We must distinguish the degree of someone's responsibility from its scope. (The term 
'extent' strikes me as ambiguous between the two.) My claim is that George and Georg bear 
responsibility to the same degree, despite the fact that George's responsibility has greater 
scope. (2002: 560-561) 
On Zimmerman’s view, an agent can be blameworthy for more things without being more 
blameworthy (i.e., an agent’s degree of blameworthiness can remain constant while the scope of 
her blameworthiness varies) and, in addition, if the result of someone’s action is a matter of luck 
then one would be just as blameworthy whether or not the result occurred. In the case of George 
and Georg, the two are equally blameworthy even though George is blameworthy for more things 
(his attempt plus the Henry’s death). Since this view denies that two agents with equal control can 
differ in degree of blameworthiness for the un/lucky results of their behavior, this scope/degree 
proposal precludes the possibility of resultant moral luck.  
 Moreover, the scope/degree response may be extended to address the problem of 
circumstantial moral luck. Consider another case Zimmerman introduces, this time of apparent 
circumstantial moral luck: 
Return to George and Henry and their counterparts, Georg and Henrik. Suppose, as before, 
that George shot at Henry and killed him. Suppose also, as before, that Georg did not kill 
Henrik; suppose now, however, that this was not because he took a shot that was 
intercepted by some unfortunate bird, but rather because he took no shot at all. And suppose 
that this was because of something quite fortuitous: Georg sneezed just as he was about to 
shoot, for example…Whereas in the case involving the bird, luck intervened after the shot 
took place, thereby preventing Henrik's death, in this sort of case the intervention occurs 
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earlier, before Georg has a chance to act at all. But the cases are united in that, in all of 
them, Georg would have freely killed Henrik but for some feature of the case over which 
he had no control. This being so, it seems that we must conclude here, as before, that Georg 
is as culpable as George. (2002: 563) 
As in the case of resultant moral luck, it is possible to do away with circumstantial moral luck by 
appealing to the distinction between the scope and degree of blameworthiness. In this case, in 
addition to the claim that an agent can be blameworthy for more things without being more 
blameworthy, this proposal says that if an agent performed an action partly because she was 
embedded in certain circumstances (over which she had no control) then the agent would be just 
as blameworthy as if she was not in those circumstances and had not performed the action. And 
since this view denies that two agents with equal control can differ in degree of blameworthiness 
for the actions that depend on un/lucky circumstances, this scope/degree proposal precludes the 
possibility of circumstantial moral luck. 
 
3. How to Solve the Problem of Constitutive Luck 
We will return below to the scope/degree response to various types of moral luck, but let 
us set aside this response for a moment and consider a natural response to the problem of 
constitutive moral luck. As the name suggests, constitutive luck is luck in how an agent is 
constituted. More specifically, for an agent to be constitutively lucky in having some aspect of her 
character, values, etc. is for those features of her constitution to be a matter of luck (i.e., outside of 
her control). This becomes a case of moral luck when two agents differ in how they are constituted, 
have no control over how they are constituted, and differ in their degree of blameworthiness for 
acting from their different constitutions. We can express the problem of constitutive moral luck 
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rhetorically as follows: given that we rarely have control over our constitution, how is it possible 
for us to be blameworthy for anything we do? But this worry can be met by reflecting on how 
agents do exert some control over their constitutions, thereby mitigating their constitutive luck. 
While everyone agrees that all agents are at least sometimes entirely constitutively lucky (at the 
very least, we are all entirely constitutively lucky at the start of our lives), it is possible, I will 
argue, for agents to contribute to the formation of their characters in a way that diminishes their 
constitutive luck at later times.  
To see how this process of diminishing constitutive luck might work, consider the 
following case from Alfred Mele: 
Chuck is evil. He enjoys killing people, and he is wholeheartedly behind his murderous 
desires, which are “well integrated into his general psychic condition.” When he was much 
younger, Chuck enjoyed torturing animals, but he was not wholeheartedly behind this. 
These activities sometimes caused him to feel guilty, he experienced bouts of 
squeamishness, and he occasionally considered abandoning animal torture. However, 
Chuck valued being the sort of person who does as he pleases and who unambivalently 
rejects conventional morality as a system designed for and by weaklings. He intentionally 
set out to ensure that he would be wholeheartedly behind his torturing of animals and 
related activities, including his merciless bullying of vulnerable people. One strand of his 
strategy was to perform cruel actions with increased frequency in order to harden himself 
against the feelings of guilt and squeamishness and eventually to extinguish the source of 
those feelings. His strategy worked. (2006: 171) 
Concerning this case, it is quite natural to say that even if Chuck was entirely constitutively lucky 
earlier in his life, he is not entirely constitutively lucky to be a cruel person after the process of 
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hardening himself to others’ suffering, and thus Chuck may be more blameworthy for the bad 
things he does after this process than he is for the bad things done at the beginning. 
More generally, we can respond to the problem of constitutive moral luck by endorsing the 
following two claims: 
1) It is possible for us to exercise indirect control over the formation of our characters by 
performing actions (for which we are responsible) that bring about changes to our 
characters at later times. 
2) One can be more blameworthy when acting from a character over which one had some 
control than one would be if entirely constitutively lucky. 
The first claim is supported by cases like Chuck’s, but one need not have as fine-grained a plan 
for shaping one’s character to be morally responsible for bringing about changes to one’s character; 
if it is reasonably foreseeable that one’s character will be shaped by one’s present actions (over 
which one has control), one may be morally responsible for bringing about a change to character.9 
The second claim is supported by the widely accepted (and intuitive) idea that luck mitigates 
blameworthiness; the more it is a matter of luck that an agent performed a certain action, the less 
control the agent exercised in performing that action and so the less the agent is blameworthy for 
it.10 
 
9 Another way to put this point is that it seems that both the control and epistemic conditions on 
moral responsibility may be met with respect to actions that shape one’s character. There is some 
debate about whether the epistemic condition can be met in cases of “tracing” (indirect control). 
See Vargas (2005) for worries about this, but see Fischer and Tognazzini (2009) for a reply.  
10 One might demur here, saying that agents like Chuck are blameworthy for more things (for 
developing their character and also for performing bad actions after forming a bad character) but 
not more blameworthy for particular actions after the process of character-formation. This view 
suffers the objections I raise in section 5. See also Cyr (2019a; 2019b; 2020) and Hartman (2020b).  
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According to this proposal, there are instances of complete constitutive moral luck (cases 
in which agents have exerted absolutely no control over their characters), but because typical 
agents have had opportunities to shape their character over time, instances of this type of moral 
luck occur only in marginal cases (including the beginning of one’s life and extreme cases of 
character-change over which an agent has no control).11 Thus, on this view, there is constitutive 
moral luck, but it is not so pervasive as to threaten blameworthiness at every point in agents’ 
lives.12 
 
4. Solving the Problem of Constitutive Luck Requires Resultant and Circumstantial Luck 
 As it turns out, however, this natural response to the problem of constitutive moral luck is 
inconsistent with any account attempting to do away with resultant or circumstantial moral luck, 
for the very process of character-formation is ridden with resultant and circumstantial moral luck. 
Consider again the case of Chuck, and notice that the connection between Chuck’s actions (his 
shooting at animals) and the effect they have on his character depends on whether certain results 
obtain. Holding fixed what is within Chuck’s control (his action), whether or not the animals are 
shot is (at least partly) a matter of resultant moral luck. In addition, whether or not Chuck is able 
to perform the relevant actions (shooting at animals) is a matter of circumstantial moral luck. And 
since (we may stipulate) the shooting of animals is essential to Chuck’s moral degeneration (i.e., 
Chuck would not have degenerated otherwise), the process of character-formation depends on 
 
11 It may be that all of us are partly constitutively lucky, insofar as there are parts of our characters 
over which we cannot exercise even indirect control, but presumably we are not always entirely 
constitutively lucky. 
12 Some have argued that there is no way to mitigate our constitutive moral luck since any response 
to our “endowment” is itself infected by constitutive moral luck. See the defenses of skepticism 
referenced in note 5 for developments of this objection, as well as the replies referenced there. 
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factors outside of Chuck’s control, including both circumstantial and resultant factors. More 
generally, when we perform actions that shape our characters, neither the circumstances that enable 
us to perform those actions nor the connection between those actions and the subsequent changes 
to our characters are under our direct control, and so the very process of character-formation will 
always involve some degree of luck.13 
To illustrate this point and the problem it raises for the scope/degree response to moral 
luck, consider a variant on the Chuck case. Another agent, Charles, might have attempted to shoot 
the same animals but, because of a gust of wind, might not have succeeded and thus would not 
have made himself as cruel as Chuck. According to the scope/degree response to resultant moral 
luck, Chuck and Charles are equally blameworthy at the time of their hunting, though Chuck may 
be blameworthy for results that don’t obtain in Charles’s case (and yet not more blameworthy, 
despite the natural thought that to be blameworthy for more things is to be more blameworthy). 
But, on the line I’ve suggested for thinking about constitutive moral luck, Chuck may be less 
constitutively lucky at later times than Charles—and thus may be more blameworthy at later times 
than Charles—despite the difference between them being a matter of (resultant) moral luck. Or 
suppose that Charles goes hunting on several occasions but never comes across any animals. 
According to the scope/degree response to circumstantial moral luck, Chuck and Charles are 
equally blameworthy at the time of their hunting trips (when they have the very same intentions to 
 
13 One might wonder whether there is any residual control over our character formation that is not 
distorted by resultant and circumstantial moral luck. (Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising 
this question.) For there to be a case in which a person’s character formation was not subject even 
simply to circumstantial moral luck, it would have to be the case that the agent was in (total) 
control of the circumstances or would have developed in exactly the same way no matter the 
circumstances (i.e., even if the circumstances had been radically different). I do not claim that such 
circumstantial-moral-luck-free character formation is impossible, but I find it highly unlikely that 
such scenarios ever actually occur in the lives of ordinary agents. 
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torture animals), though Chuck may be blameworthy for killing animals that Charles never 
encounters. But, again, on the plausible account of how constitutive moral luck may be mitigated, 
Chuck may be less constitutively lucky at later times than Charles—and thus may be more 
blameworthy at later times than Charles—despite the difference between them being a matter of 
(circumstantial) moral luck. 
Given that the process that we ordinarily assume mitigates constitutive moral luck is itself 
ridden with resultant and circumstantial moral luck, we must either deny that constitutive moral 
luck may be mitigated in the way we ordinarily assume, or we accept that there can be (and is) 
resultant and circumstantial moral luck. Either way, we’re stuck with moral luck. On one horn of 
the dilemma, we allow constitutive moral luck (and more of it than is intuitive, since this horn 
rejects the mitigation proposal); on the other horn, we must accept resultant and circumstantial 
moral luck. My aim here has been to develop the dilemma, but, since I find it rather implausible 
to reject the common-sense picture of the mitigation of constitutive moral luck in order to maintain 
that there is no resultant or circumstantial moral luck, my own inclination is to accept the 
dilemma’s second horn.14 
 
5. Can We Escape the Dilemma? 
 I have argued that accepting the natural solution to the problem of constitutive moral luck 
requires admitting the existence of resultant and circumstantial moral luck, since we must either 
 
14 I have not provided any reason for accepting the second horn beyond the point that this follows 
from a plausible picture of how constitutive moral luck is mitigated. Some theorists—such as 
quality of will theorists, who take an agent’s blameworthiness to depend only on the agent’s quality 
of will—will have antecedent reason to countenance a larger quantity of constitutive moral luck 
than I think is plausible, and such theorists will therefore have antecedent reason to accept the first 
horn of the dilemma. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. 
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deny that our constitutive moral luck may be mitigated by character-formation, or we must admit 
the reality of resultant and circumstantial moral luck. A potential objection to the dilemma says 
that we need not accept my proposed solution to the problem of constitutive moral luck. Instead, 
according to the objection, we can use an appropriately modified scope/degree response to the 
problem of constitutive moral luck. While this approach to constitutive moral luck would deny the 
natural thought that we sometimes mitigate our constitutive moral luck over time by exercising 
indirect control over our character-formation, it would deny the reality of constitutive moral luck 
by claiming that if an agent performed an action partly because of her constitution (over which she 
had no control) then the agent would be just as blameworthy as if she had some other constitution 
and had not performed the action. 
 But this approach to constitutive luck is unpromising, for it fails to take seriously the way 
in which constitutive luck mitigates control (and thus blameworthiness). Consider another case 
from Mele: 
Ann is a free agent and an exceptionally industrious philosopher. She puts in twelve solid 
hours a day, seven days a week, and she enjoys almost every minute of it. Beth, an equally 
talented colleague, values many things above philosophy for reasons that she has refined 
and endorsed on the basis of careful critical reflection over many years. Beth identifies 
with and enjoys her own way of life, and she is confident that it has a breadth, depth, and 
richness that long days in the office would destroy. Their dean wants Beth to be like 
Ann…Without the knowledge of either philosopher, he hires a team of psychologists to 
determine what makes Ann tick and a team of new-wave brainwashers to make Beth like 
Ann. The psychologists decide that Ann’s peculiar hierarchy of values accounts for her 
productivity, and the brainwashers instill the same hierarchy in Beth while eradicating all 
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competing values—via new-wave brainwashing, of course. Beth is now, in the relevant 
respect, a “psychological twin” of Ann. (2006: 164-165) 
Suppose that, upon being manipulated, Beth fails to fulfill a promise to pick up her friend from the 
airport, spending some extra time at the office to review a manuscript instead, and suppose that 
Ann (who was not manipulated) does exactly the same thing. Intuitively, if Beth is at all 
blameworthy for staying to review the manuscript, she is not as blameworthy as Ann is, for Ann 
had more control over her behavior than Beth had over hers (given her recent manipulation). 
According to the scope/degree proposal concerning constitutive moral luck, however, Beth and 
Ann must be equally blameworthy.15 Additionally, according to this proposal, even if Beth had not 
been manipulated, because she would have acted differently had her constitution been different 
(and since she had no control over this), she would be just as blameworthy as Ann and 
manipulated-Beth despite never failing to fulfill the promise to her friend. Given these incredibly 
counterintuitive implications of the scope/degree proposal concerning constitutive moral luck, it 
would be better, I conclude, to admit that we face the dilemma introduced above and thus that 




15 As Bob Hartman has pointed out to me, Zimmerman’s strategy does not apply easily to the 
Ann/Beth case, for Zimmerman’s strategy aims to show that a person who performs an action can 
be just as blameworthy as her counterpart who does not perform that action but would have 
performed that action if she had the same constitutive luck, whereas the Ann/Beth case is one in 
which two agents with different constitutive luck do perform the same action. One could adopt 
Zimmerman’s more limited strategy to avoid the problem I have just raised (although it would be 
surprising for the scope/degree response to be inapplicable to cases like the Ann/Beth case), but 
even Zimmerman’s more limited strategy will be vulnerable to my next objection. 
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